Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black Saturday research by Whittaker, Joshua & Handmer, John
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Science, Medicine and Health - Papers:
Part B Faculty of Science, Medicine and Health
2010
Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black
Saturday research
Joshua Whittaker
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, wjoshua@uow.edu.au
John Handmer
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Whittaker, J. & Handmer, J. (2010). Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black Saturday research. The Australian Journal of
Emergency Management, 25 (4), 7-13.
Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black Saturday research
Abstract
Following the 'Black Saturday' bushfires of 7 February 2009, a number of research reports on community
bushfire safety were presented to the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. These include reports from the
CFA, OESC, Bushfire CRC and Department of Justice. These reports have different research aims and employ
a range of methods and samples. Some reports investigate community safety issues during the Black Saturday
bushfires, while others examine preparedness and intentions for future fires. This paper reviews these reports
to identify common findings, inconsistencies and gaps relating to community safety during bushfires, and
discusses the implications of methodological differences for research findings.
Keywords
community, safety:, review, bushfire, post-black, research, saturday
Publication Details
Whittaker, J. & Handmer, J. (2010). Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black Saturday research. The
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 25 (4), 7-13.
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/smhpapers1/302
7
Introduction
Saturday 7 February 2009 brought predictions of 
the worst fire weather conditions in the Australian 
state of Victoria’s history. The weather conditions 
were significantly worse than predicted with a record 
high in the state capital’s CBD (Melbourne) of 46.5 
degrees Celsius and higher temperatures elsewhere. 
The day came after a severe and protracted drought, 
with most of Victoria receiving below average rainfall 
in the previous 12 years and the area surrounding 
Melbourne receiving the lowest rainfall on record 
(Teague et al. 2009, p.36). 173 people lost their lives 
and more than 2000 homes were destroyed in the fires, 
as well as significant dollar losses and long-lasting 
intangible impacts on those affected. Approximately 
6000 households were directly affected by the fires and 
thousands more were severely disrupted. In addition to 
the lives lost from the fires, health authorities estimate 
that the January heatwave contributed to the deaths 
of another 374 people (Department of Human Services 
2009). The research reports reviewed in this paper are 
concerned only with bushfires.
A number of research reports on human behaviour  
and bushfire safety (referred to in this paper as 
‘community safety’) have been presented to the Victorian 
Bushfires Royal Commission, including reports from the 
Country Fire Authority (CFA), Office of the Emergency 
Services Commissioner (OESC), Bushfire Cooperative 
Research Centre (CRC) and Department of Justice. These 
reports have different research aims and employ a range 
of methods and samples. Some reports investigate 
household safety issues during the Black Saturday 
bushfires, while others examine preparedness and 
intentions for future fires.
The OESC commissioned a study to review the  
post-fire research reports that were presented to the 
Commission. The aim of the study was: to identify 
common findings, inconsistencies and gaps relating 
to community bushfire safety; to document the 
implications of methodological differences for  
the research findings; and to suggest areas where 
further research and agency efforts are needed.  
This paper summarises aspects of that study.  
While the findings set out below are well-supported 
by data, it is important to recognise that generalised 
statements inevitably conceal the variation and 
complexity of individual and community attitudes, 
intentions and behaviours. Nevertheless, by examining 
and bringing together results from many reports 
through a systematic analysis, this study has produced 
well-grounded results. The detail of each report and of 
our analysis can be found in the full report prepared for 
the OESC (Whittaker and Handmer 2010).
Approach
Most reviews of individual studies are in narrative form. 
Among their shortcomings, narrative reviews typically 
do not discuss how studies were selected for inclusion 
(the sample of studies is typically based on the author’s 
whim, rather than on clear criteria), or provide explicit 
criteria for the assessment of the quality of, or the 
impacts identified by, different studies. This tends to 
hide any bias by the author(s), and importantly does not 
allow for findings to be replicated. In the medical and 
health sciences this has led to concern about the quality 
of reviews on which evidence based practice depends 
(Hemingway and Brereton 2009). 
Community bushfire safety: a review 
of post-Black Saturday research
Dr. Joshua Whittaker and Prof. John Handmer analyse the research reports 
presented to the recent Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. 
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The idea of a systematic review evolved from these 
concerns with the intention of applying the same 
rigour in secondary research as is expected in primary 
research: “a systematic review is an overview of 
primary studies which contains an explicit statement 
of objectives, materials, and methods and has been 
conducted according to explicit and reproducible 
methodology” (Greenhalgh 1997). A meta-analysis is 
a statistical synthesis of the results of a number of 
primary studies that addressed the same question in 
a similar or ideally the same way. These approaches 
are now very widely used and have become routine in 
medical science (e.g. see the Cochrane Collaboration), 
and the techniques of systematic reviewing are 
developing rapidly (Hemingway and Brereton 2009). 
Despite the apparent benefits, systematic reviews 
are subject to a number of important criticisms 
(Greenhalgh 1997; Hemingway and Brereton 2009). 
Many reviews do not follow the ideal review process.  
A major failing is often the selection of studies to 
include, with unpublished material often being ignored. 
Another issue is the combination of studies undertaken 
with different aims at different times and places 
(Eysenck 1995). 
Here we do not undertake a full systematic review,  
but attempt to address some of the fundamentals of 
that approach, in particular the issues of study inclusion, 
quality, and interpretation of findings in the context of the 
individual study aims and methodology. The quality of 
research was assessed before inclusion, but this was not 
done using external blind peer reviewing. 
All of the post-fire studies prepared for the Royal 
Commission were assessed as being of reasonable 
quality and are included, although the study on refuges 
of last resort is not included in most of the analysis due 
to its specific focus. It should be noted that none have 
been published in the scientific literature at this stage, 
but some were subject to review as part of internal 
quality control processes.
The research reports
For this study we reviewed the major community safety 
research reports presented to the Royal Commission, 
with the exception of a report dealing solely with 
fatalities (Handmer et al. 2010). These included reports 
from the CFA, the OESC, the Bushfire CRC and the 
Department of Justice. 
Table 1 presents detail of the nine studies that were 
reviewed, including the aims, methods of data 
collection, sampling, timing and analysis of each, and 
their implications for research findings1. Readers are 
referred to the full review (Whittaker and Handmer 
2010) and the individual studies (listed at the end of this 
paper) for more detailed discussions of research 
methodologies and findings.
Research aims and methods
The aims of a research project shape results by guiding 
the questions researchers ask and the methods that 
are used to investigate them. Aims vary and are a key 
issue in comparison. A distinction can be drawn between 
the reports that aim to investigate general attitudes, 
intentions and behaviours related to bushfire risk, and 
those that aim to investigate aspects of a specific event 
or threat. The OESC, Department of Justice and first CFA 
reports all investigate general attitudes, intentions and 
behaviours to bushfire risk, with a focus on what people 
intend to do in various circumstances. In contrast, the 
second CFA report and both Bushfire CRC reports focus 
on actual behaviours and responses to specific events or 
threats, in addition to intentions. For example, the CFA 
report investigates responses to an actual declaration of 
a Code Red/catastrophic bushfire danger day, and both 
Bushfire CRC reports investigate both intended  
and actual responses to the 7 February bushfires.
While reports on general bushfire risk present  
findings on levels of awareness, preparedness and 
intended actions for future fires, they do not necessarily 
indicate how people will respond when confronted with 
a bushfire. 
Questionnaires were the most common form  
of data collection. Questionnaires are a time and  
cost effective method of collecting large amounts  
of data that can be analysed relatively easily and quickly. 
The questionnaires used by the OESC, Department of 
Justice and CFA generated quantitative data. Those 
used by the Bushfire CRC research group contained 
both pre-coded responses and open-ended questions. 
These open-ended questions allowed respondents 
to explain their responses in their own terms and 
produced qualitative data. The Bushfire CRC research 
group’s first report was based on interviews that 
produced only qualitative data.
All methods of data collection contain inherent biases. 
For example, a landline phone survey is likely to exclude 
those who favour mobile phone use and/or do not 
have landlines – often younger people. Online surveys 
are likely to exclude those who do not have personal 
access to a computer and/or the internet, or who make 
limited use of the internet – often older people. There is 
potential for bias in any survey where a disproportionate 
number of people from an identifiable group do not 
respond.
All of the studies took measures to avoid sampling bias, 
such as taking a large, random sample and filling certain 
demographic and geographical quotas (Table 1). Findings 
may therefore be said to be more or less representative 
of the populations from which each sample was drawn. 
Studies by the Department of Justice, OESC and CFA 
variously sampled populations in the 52 high bushfire 
risk townships (as designated by the CFA), Fire Danger 
Rating (FDR) districts, and the state as a whole. Studies 
by the Bushfire CRC were principally concerned with 
community safety during the Black Saturday fires and 
Table 1: Summary of the reports examined. 
Report(s) Primary aim(s) Method of data collection/analysis Sample Timing Implications for research findings
Where are they going? 
People movement during 
bushfires AND Household 
locational intentions during 
bushfire threats (OESC)
Explore why, when and how people intend to 
leave their properties;
Discover people’s intentions to stay or go on 
Code Red days;
Understand what ‘places of last resort’ mean 
to people.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via landline telephone 
interviews;
Frequency counts.
Random sample of 616 households within 
the 52 high bushfire risk townships, which 
are represented in the sample to reflect their 
significance within the total population.
Late October to early 
November 2009
Primary focus on intended rather than 
actual behaviour /actions.
Summer fire campaign: 
benchmark research 
AND Wave 1 Research 
(Department of Justice)
Assess impact of the Department’s ‘Summer 
Fire Campaign’ on bushfire awareness and 
preparedness.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered online and via Computer 
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI);
Frequency counts.
Benchmark research: 300 respondents from the 
52 high bushfire risk towns (telephone interviews) 
and 507 respondents from the general Victorian 
pop. via an online panel, with quotas placed on age, 
gender and location to ensure a representative 
sample (online survey);
Wave 1 research: as above, with a sample of  
300 respondents for the telephone interviews and 
503 respondents for the online survey.
5-10th October 2009 
(Benchmark)
10-17th December 2009  
(Wave 1)
Focus on impact of Campaign in raising 
awareness and preparedness levels.
Behaviour and intentions of 
households in high bushfire 
risk areas (CFA)
Determine the extent to which the February 
7th fires, subsequent media coverage and 
new messages have resulted in modified 
community behaviour and intentions.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via telephone interviews;
Frequency counts and cross-tabulations.
Random sample of 400 households within 
the 52 high bushfire risk townships, which 
are represented in the sample to reflect their 
significance within the total population.
mid-December 2009 Primary focus on intended rather than 
actual behaviour /actions.
Concerned with changes in behaviour 
and intentions.
Behaviour and intentions of 
households on code red days 
(CFA)
Investigate the behaviour and intentions of 
householders in the fire danger districts 
during Code Red or catastrophic bushfire 
danger days.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via telephone interviews;
Frequency counts and cross-tabulations.
Random sample of 602 households within the 
Wimmera, Northern Country and North East FDR 
districts.
14-21st January 2010 Findings related to respondents’ 
awareness and responses to an actual 
Code Red warning.
Research results from 
the February 7th Victorian 
fires: first report on human 
behaviour and community 
safety issues (Bushfire CRC)
Investigate the human behavioural factors 
that influenced patterns of life and property 
loss/survival during the February 7th fires;
Provide qualitative insights into human 
behaviour and community safety issues 
arising from the fires.
Semi-structured interview comprised of open-
ended questions;
Interview questions explore a common 
set of issues or topics, but questions may 
ask different questions, phrase questions 
differently, and ask questions in a  
different order;
Qualitative analysis.
‘Opportunistic’ sample of 301 residents affected 
by the 7 February fires. Sample covers a range 
of different locations, communities and fire 
intensities, as well as different outcomes in terms 
of human behaviour and community safety.
12th February to  
mid-April 2009
Focus on a specific bushfire event.
Concerned with intended and actual 
behaviour.
Research results from the 
February 7th Victorian fires: 
second report on human 
behaviour and community 
safety issues (Bushfire CRC)
Investigate the human behavioural factors 
that influenced patterns of life and property 
loss/survival during the February 7th fires;
Present quantitative data on human 
behaviour and community safety issues 
arising from the fires.
Questionnaire comprised of short, pre-coded 
questions and some open-ended questions;
Administered via mail;
Frequency counts and limited cross-
tabulations.
Sample of 1104 (final sample 1315) households 
within areas affected by the February 7th bushfires.
October to December 2009 Focus on a specific bushfire event.
Concerned with intended and actual 
behaviour.
Use of informal places of 
shelter and last resort on 
7 February 2009 (Bushfire 
CRC)
Examine evidence concerning ‘unofficial 
places of last resort shelter’ during the 
February 7th fires.
Multiple sources of secondary data;
Qualitative analysis.
N/A Initial interviews collected in 
12th February to mid-April 
2009. Supplementary work 
undertaken in late 2009.
Focus on a specific bushfire event and 
issue (unofficial places of shelter).
A primary focus on actual behaviour.
 
1 The Department of Justice and OESC both produced two reports from their respective research projects. Our review considers each pair concurrently. 
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therefore sampled populations within the impacted 
areas. These studies did not employ random sampling 
strategies due to the relatively small size of the impacted 
population and the need to collect as much data as 
possible. Clearly, people with recent experience of fire 
are more likely to be aware of fire-related issues and be 
more sensitive to safety concerns.
All of the studies were undertaken after the  
Black Saturday bushfires. Consequently, the  
data collected for each report is influenced by 
respondents’ recollections of the fires, subsequent 
media coverage, and heightened concern about the 
2009/10 fire season. The semi-structured interviews 
undertaken by the Bushfire CRC immediately after the 
fires will have been influenced least by outside sources. 
Those conducted later in the year are likely to have 
been influenced by the considerable media coverage 
and new advice from agencies.
Review of key research findings
Analysis of the research reports identified a range of 
findings related to the following issues: 
• Awareness and attitudes to bushfire risk;
• Planning and preparedness;
• Awareness and understanding of the Code Red Fire 
Danger Rating (FDR)2; 
• Intended responses to Code Red declarations;
• Decisions about when to leave and where to go; and
• Intended responses for the 2008/09 and 2009/10  
fire seasons;
• Actions taken during bushfires.
Readers are directed to the full report for a more 
detailed discussion of key research findings (Whittaker 
and Handmer 2010).
High level of awareness
The reports revealed a generally high level of bushfire 
awareness in high fire risk areas, with Department 
of Justice and Bushfire CRC research reporting that 
around 80% of respondents considered themselves at 
risk. This is consistent with CFA research that found 
high levels of acceptance of personal responsibility for 
bushfire safety, with more than 90% of respondents 
agreeing that: a bushfire may impact on their property; 
they must be self-sufficient in the event of a fire; and 
they are responsible for their home and property during 
the bushfire season.
However, interviews conducted immediately after the 
Black Saturday fires by the Bushfire CRC revealed 
that many people living in suburban locations had not 
considered themselves at risk prior to 7 February.  
This was confirmed in the CRC mail survey, where a 
greater proportion of respondents from fire affected 
parts of Bendigo (60%) and Horsham (49%) reported 
that they hadn’t considered or decided what they would 
do if a fire occurred, or had decided that they didn’t 
need to do anything.
Of course, findings related to bushfire awareness will 
have been influenced by recollections of the Black 
Saturday fires, subsequent media coverage and 
heightened concern about the 2009/10 fire season.
Variation in fire plans  
and preparedness
The reports reveal a great deal of variation in planning 
and preparedness. Reports by the Department of 
Justice, Bushfire CRC and CFA and all found that 
around two-thirds of households had fire plans, with 
around 20-25% having a written plan. However, the 
Bushfire CRC’s interviews with households affected by 
the fires revealed considerable variation in the quality of 
fire plans and their effectiveness during the fires.  
It also found that many people were not prepared for 
the severity of the February 7 fires. Around half of those 
surveyed by the Bushfire CRC rated their preparedness 
as high or very high; however, three-quarters wanted to 
be more prepared, suggesting that self-reported levels 
of awareness may be somewhat overstated.
Limited understanding of  
Code Red FDR
The research suggests a limited understanding of the 
new FDR system. CFA research found that around 60% 
of residents in high fire risk areas were aware that Code 
Red is the highest level of danger and that on Code 
Red days emergency services’ advice is to leave early. 
However, Department of Justice research found lower 
levels of understanding in high bushfire risk areas, with 
around one-fifth of respondents identifying Code Red 
as the highest FDR and one-third aware emergency 
services’ advice is to leave on these days. 
There are a number of reasons why these findings are 
not strictly comparable. The CFA asked respondents 
if they knew what the highest fire danger rating is 
now called, providing them with a number of pre-
coded response (e.g. ‘Code Red/catastrophic’; ‘Other 
description – extreme, severe, very high’). In contrast, 
the Department of Justice asked respondents to explain 
what the Code Red FDR means to them, recording 
responses verbatim. The findings presented in the 
report were generated by classifying responses into a 
much broader range of categories (e.g. ‘Evacuate/get 
out/get ready to leave’; ‘It’s the worst case/the highest 
rating’; ‘Put our fire plan into action’ etc.). All of these 
and other responses could conceivably be considered 
‘correct’ given the question asked respondents what 
Code Red means to them. The Department of Justice 
research also considered closely-related responses 
such as ‘It’s the worst case/the highest rating’ and ‘It’s 
catastrophic’ separately.  
 
2 Following the February 2009 fires, AFAC convened a national workshop to review the fire danger rating (FDR) system and accompanying warning  
 messages. The new highest fire danger rating is called ‘Catastrophic’ or ‘Code Red’. 
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Had these responses been grouped together, the 
research would most likely have found that a higher 
proportion of people understood a Code Red warning to 
mean the highest or catastrophic fire danger. Reanalysis 
of the Department of Justice data could be useful. 
Waiting
The reports consistently found that many people intend 
to wait for advice from emergency services or until 
they are directly threatened before taking action. CFA 
and OESC research found that around one-quarter of 
those who intend to leave would wait for advice from 
emergency services before leaving. Bushfire CRC 
research found that one-quarter of those affected by the 
Black Saturday fires intended to wait and see what the 
fires were like, or until they were directly threatened, 
before deciding to stay or go. This is supported by 
research into actual responses to the fires, which found 
that half of those who left considered themselves to 
have left ‘late’ or ‘very late’ and that one-third of those 
who stayed to defend left during the fire. 
Table 1: Summary of the reports examined. 
Report(s) Primary aim(s) Method of data collection/analysis Sample Timing Implications for research findings
Where are they going? 
People movement during 
bushfires AND Household 
locational intentions during 
bushfire threats (OESC)
Explore why, when and how people intend to 
leave their properties;
Discover people’s intentions to stay or go on 
Code Red days;
Understand what ‘places of last resort’ mean 
to people.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via landline telephone 
interviews;
Frequency counts.
Random sample of 616 households within 
the 52 high bushfire risk townships, which 
are represented in the sample to reflect their 
significance within the total population.
Late October to early 
November 2009
Primary focus on intended rather than 
actual behaviour /actions.
Summer fire campaign: 
benchmark research 
AND Wave 1 Research 
(Department of Justice)
Assess impact of the Department’s ‘Summer 
Fire Campaign’ on bushfire awareness and 
preparedness.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered online and via Computer 
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI);
Frequency counts.
Benchmark research: 300 respondents from the 
52 high bushfire risk towns (telephone interviews) 
and 507 respondents from the general Victorian 
pop. via an online panel, with quotas placed on age, 
gender and location to ensure a representative 
sample (online survey);
Wave 1 research: as above, with a sample of  
300 respondents for the telephone interviews and 
503 respondents for the online survey.
5-10th October 2009 
(Benchmark)
10-17th December 2009  
(Wave 1)
Focus on impact of Campaign in raising 
awareness and preparedness levels.
Behaviour and intentions of 
households in high bushfire 
risk areas (CFA)
Determine the extent to which the February 
7th fires, subsequent media coverage and 
new messages have resulted in modified 
community behaviour and intentions.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via telephone interviews;
Frequency counts and cross-tabulations.
Random sample of 400 households within 
the 52 high bushfire risk townships, which 
are represented in the sample to reflect their 
significance within the total population.
mid-December 2009 Primary focus on intended rather than 
actual behaviour /actions.
Concerned with changes in behaviour 
and intentions.
Behaviour and intentions of 
households on code red days 
(CFA)
Investigate the behaviour and intentions of 
householders in the fire danger districts 
during Code Red or catastrophic bushfire 
danger days.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via telephone interviews;
Frequency counts and cross-tabulations.
Random sample of 602 households within the 
Wimmera, Northern Country and North East FDR 
districts.
14-21st January 2010 Findings related to respondents’ 
awareness and responses to an actual 
Code Red warning.
Research results from 
the February 7th Victorian 
fires: first report on human 
behaviour and community 
safety issues (Bushfire CRC)
Investigate the human behavioural factors 
that influenced patterns of life and property 
loss/survival during the February 7th fires;
Provide qualitative insights into human 
behaviour and community safety issues 
arising from the fires.
Semi-structured interview comprised of open-
ended questions;
Interview questions explore a common 
set of issues or topics, but questions may 
ask different questions, phrase questions 
differently, and ask questions in a  
different order;
Qualitative analysis.
‘Opportunistic’ sample of 301 residents affected 
by the 7 February fires. Sample covers a range 
of different locations, communities and fire 
intensities, as well as different outcomes in terms 
of human behaviour and community safety.
12th February to  
mid-April 2009
Focus on a specific bushfire event.
Concerned with intended and actual 
behaviour.
Research results from the 
February 7th Victorian fires: 
second report on human 
behaviour and community 
safety issues (Bushfire CRC)
Investigate the human behavioural factors 
that influenced patterns of life and property 
loss/survival during the February 7th fires;
Present quantitative data on human 
behaviour and community safety issues 
arising from the fires.
Questionnaire comprised of short, pre-coded 
questions and some open-ended questions;
Administered via mail;
Frequency counts and limited cross-
tabulations.
Sample of 1104 (final sample 1315) households 
within areas affected by the February 7th bushfires.
October to December 2009 Focus on a specific bushfire event.
Concerned with intended and actual 
behaviour.
Use of informal places of 
shelter and last resort on 
7 February 2009 (Bushfire 
CRC)
Examine evidence concerning ‘unofficial 
places of last resort shelter’ during the 
February 7th fires.
Multiple sources of secondary data;
Qualitative analysis.
N/A Initial interviews collected in 
12th February to mid-April 
2009. Supplementary work 
undertaken in late 2009.
Focus on a specific bushfire event and 
issue (unofficial places of shelter).
A primary focus on actual behaviour.
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Variation in intended responses
The research reports present varied findings relating to 
people’s intended responses to bushfires. Research by 
the OESC and CFA found that during the 2008/09 bushfire 
season around two-thirds of those in high bushfire risk 
areas intended to leave their homes, while around 30% 
intended to stay. However, the Bushfire CRC’s survey of 
those directly affected by the Black Saturday fires found 
that half had intended to stay, with 19% reporting their 
intention to leave and 26% intending to ‘wait-and-see’. 
Similar differences can be seen in findings related to 
intentions for the 2009/10 fire season.
These differences reflect variation in the samples and 
timing of the research, as well as how questions were 
asked and data coded. For example, one OESC finding 
classified responses as ‘leave’ or ‘stay and defend’.  
The Bushfire CRC questionnaire included a much broader 
range of responses, including: ‘leave as soon as you know 
there is a fire threatening your town or suburb’; ‘wait to 
see what the bushfire is like before making a decision’; 
and ‘hadn’t thought about it’. Nevertheless, this does not 
explain the significantly higher proportion of Bushfire CRC 
respondents who intended to stay and defend in 2008/09. 
This discrepancy could reflect the influence on the OESC 
Table 1: Summary of the reports examined. 
Report(s) Primary aim(s) Method of data collection/analysis Sample Timing Implications for research findings
Where are they going? 
People movement during 
bushfires AND Household 
locational intentions during 
bushfire threats (OESC)
Explore why, when and how people intend to 
leave their properties;
Discover people’s intentions to stay or go on 
Code Red days;
Understand what ‘places of last resort’ mean 
to people.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via landline telephone 
interviews;
Frequency counts.
Random sample of 616 households within 
the 52 high bushfire risk townships, which 
are represented in the sample to reflect their 
significance within the total population.
Late October to early 
November 2009
Primary focus on intended rather than 
actual behaviour /actions.
Summer fire campaign: 
benchmark research 
AND Wave 1 Research 
(Department of Justice)
Assess impact of the Department’s ‘Summer 
Fire Campaign’ on bushfire awareness and 
preparedness.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered online and via Computer 
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI);
Frequency counts.
Benchmark research: 300 respondents from the 
52 high bushfire risk towns (telephone interviews) 
and 507 respondents from the general Victorian 
pop. via an online panel, with quotas placed on age, 
gender and location to ensure a representative 
sample (online survey);
Wave 1 research: as above, with a sample of  
300 respondents for the telephone interviews and 
503 respondents for the online survey.
5-10th October 2009 
(Benchmark)
10-17th December 2009  
(Wave 1)
Focus on impact of Campaign in raising 
awareness and preparedness levels.
Behaviour and intentions of 
households in high bushfire 
risk areas (CFA)
Determine the extent to which the February 
7th fires, subsequent media coverage and 
new messages have resulted in modified 
community behaviour and intentions.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via telephone interviews;
Frequency counts and cross-tabulations.
Random sample of 400 households within 
the 52 high bushfire risk townships, which 
are represented in the sample to reflect their 
significance within the total population.
mid-December 2009 Primary focus on intended rather than 
actual behaviour /actions.
Concerned with changes in behaviour 
and intentions.
Behaviour and intentions of 
households on code red days 
(CFA)
Investigate the behaviour and intentions of 
householders in the fire danger districts 
during Code Red or catastrophic bushfire 
danger days.
Questionnaire comprised mostly of short, pre-
coded questions;
Administered via telephone interviews;
Frequency counts and cross-tabulations.
Random sample of 602 households within the 
Wimmera, Northern Country and North East FDR 
districts.
14-21st January 2010 Findings related to respondents’ 
awareness and responses to an actual 
Code Red warning.
Research results from 
the February 7th Victorian 
fires: first report on human 
behaviour and community 
safety issues (Bushfire CRC)
Investigate the human behavioural factors 
that influenced patterns of life and property 
loss/survival during the February 7th fires;
Provide qualitative insights into human 
behaviour and community safety issues 
arising from the fires.
Semi-structured interview comprised of open-
ended questions;
Interview questions explore a common 
set of issues or topics, but questions may 
ask different questions, phrase questions 
differently, and ask questions in a  
different order;
Qualitative analysis.
‘Opportunistic’ sample of 301 residents affected 
by the 7 February fires. Sample covers a range 
of different locations, communities and fire 
intensities, as well as different outcomes in terms 
of human behaviour and community safety.
12th February to  
mid-April 2009
Focus on a specific bushfire event.
Concerned with intended and actual 
behaviour.
Research results from the 
February 7th Victorian fires: 
second report on human 
behaviour and community 
safety issues (Bushfire CRC)
Investigate the human behavioural factors 
that influenced patterns of life and property 
loss/survival during the February 7th fires;
Present quantitative data on human 
behaviour and community safety issues 
arising from the fires.
Questionnaire comprised of short, pre-coded 
questions and some open-ended questions;
Administered via mail;
Frequency counts and limited cross-
tabulations.
Sample of 1104 (final sample 1315) households 
within areas affected by the February 7th bushfires.
October to December 2009 Focus on a specific bushfire event.
Concerned with intended and actual 
behaviour.
Use of informal places of 
shelter and last resort on 
7 February 2009 (Bushfire 
CRC)
Examine evidence concerning ‘unofficial 
places of last resort shelter’ during the 
February 7th fires.
Multiple sources of secondary data;
Qualitative analysis.
N/A Initial interviews collected in 
12th February to mid-April 
2009. Supplementary work 
undertaken in late 2009.
Focus on a specific bushfire event and 
issue (unofficial places of shelter).
A primary focus on actual behaviour.
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study of media coverage and new key messages that 
emphasise leaving on the people’s recollections of past 
intentions. Those who actually experienced the February 
7th fires are more likely to have reflected on their real 
intentions prior to the fires and how these related to their 
actual response. 
Research also suggests a gender dimension to intended 
responses, with women more likely to want to leave than 
men. This is supported by other recent bushfire research 
(Proudley 2008; Handmer et al. 2010; Haynes et al. 2010).
Major gap between intentions  
and actions 
A number of the reports identify significant disparities 
between expressed intentions and actual responses 
to bushfire risk. Research by the Department of 
Justice, OESC and CFA found that 50-60% of residents 
intended to leave for Code Red days, with more than 
60% intending to leave the night before or early in the 
morning. However, the CFA’s research following the 
declaration of a Code Red day in three FDR districts 
found that very few acted on their intention. It found 
that two-thirds of residents were at home on the day. Of 
the third that weren’t at home, just 1.5% left because 
it was a Code Red day. Furthermore, intentions appear 
to be influenced by perceived false alarms, with around 
three-quarters of residents indicating that they would 
not leave early on future Code Red days. 
The Bushfire CRC’s research into responses to the 
Black Saturday fires found that a significantly higher 
proportion of respondents (around half) stayed to 
defend than is suggested by research into intended 
responses for the 2008-09 fire season. Highlighting 
the gap between intentions and actions, it found that 
half of those who intended to leave safely endangered 
themselves by leaving late, while a third of those who 
stayed to defend left at some stage during the fire.  
The study also highlights confusion about what it means 
to ‘leave early’ (see also Tibbits and  
Whittaker 2007).
Differences due to  
different methodologies
Most of the differences between the research reports 
are minor and can be explained by variations in the 
aims, methods of data collection, samples, timing  
and methods of analysis that were undertaken for  
each study.
A fundamental point of difference between the studies 
is whether they examine people’s actual experiences 
and responses to bushfires, or their attitudes and 
intended responses to future bushfires. Differences 
in the way questions are worded and the response 
options that are provided also account for some of the 
differences. For example, telephone surveys required 
rapid responses generally according to pre-defined 
categories, while face-to-face interviews and mail 
surveys allow respondents to reflect more and provide a 
wider range of responses.
Small variations would be expected between studies 
even where they used identical samples, methods 
and survey questions. This is due to the uncertainties 
involved in any sampling. For the quantitative surveys 
reviewed here, the expected variation is generally within 
plus or minus 5% (at a 95% confidence level, which is 
the level typically employed in survey research). Greater 
variation can be expected in qualitative research due to 
the more subjective and interpretive nature of analysis. 
The quantitative reports all had adequate sample sizes 
ranging from about 500 to 1350. However, as different 
sampling strategies were used some reports were 
based on people with greater awareness and interest in 
bushfire risk,  
which would be expected to return higher scores  
for awareness, knowledge and preparation. 
Conclusions
The review identified a range of common findings 
across the reports. The reports suggest high levels 
of bushfire awareness in high risk areas (around 
80%), but lower levels in more suburban locations. 
Note that recollections of the 2009 fires, subsequent 
media coverage and heightened concern about the 
2009/10 fire season are likely to have raised levels of 
awareness above what they would otherwise have been. 
The reports also suggest that around two-thirds of 
households in bushfire risk areas have fire plans, with 
around one-quarter having a written plan. Importantly, 
however, there is considerable variation in the quality 
of people’s plans and preparedness, and therefore in 
their effectiveness during fires. There appears to be a 
moderate level of understanding of the new Code Red 
FDR, with around 60% of residents understanding that 
‘Code Red’ refers to the highest level of fire danger and 
that emergency services’ advice is to leave early on 
these days. The reports confirm that many residents 
intend to wait for advice from emergency services or 
until they are directly threatened before taking action. 
Around one-quarter of those who intend to leave would 
wait for advice from emergency services. 
The disparity between intentions and actions is a 
major issue for fire and emergency services. Research 
demonstrates that what people intend to do and what 
they actually do during a bushfire can vary considerably, 
with actual responses often more risky. It is clear that 
understanding and good intentions do not necessarily 
equate to and are not good predictors of appropriate 
actions. Fire and emergency services must continue 
to raise awareness and promote better planning and 
preparedness in bushfire risk areas, especially for the 
minority who remain unaware of the risk. However, 
future research should concentrate on resolving the 
very large gap between good intentions and appropriate 
actions. 
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1 The Department of Justice and OESC both produced two reports from their respective research projects. Our review considers each pair concurrently. 
 
2 Following the February 2009 fires, AFAC convened a national workshop to review the fire danger rating (FDR) system and accompanying warning  
 messages. The new highest fire danger rating is called ‘Catastrophic’ or ‘Code Red’. 
